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Abstract 
 
This research demonstrates how counterfactual thoughts can lead people to excuse 
others for telling falsehoods. When a falsehood aligned with participants’ political 
preferences, reflecting on how it could have been true led them to judge it as less unethical to 
tell, which in turn led them to judge a politician who told it as having a more moral character 
and deserving less punishment. When a falsehood did not align with political preferences, 
this effect was significantly smaller and less reliable, in part because people doubted the 
plausibility of the relevant counterfactual thoughts. These results emerged independently in 
three studies (two pre-registered; total N = 2,783) and in meta- and Bayesian analyses, 
regardless of whether participants considered the same counterfactuals or generated their 
own. The results reveal how counterfactual thoughts can amplify partisan differences in 
judgments of alleged dishonesty. I discuss implications for theories of counterfactual thinking 
and motivated moral reasoning.  
 
Keywords: counterfactual thinking, ethics/morality, social judgment, dishonesty, lies, 
political psychology, Trump, Clinton 
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It Could Have Been True:  
How Counterfactual Thoughts Reduce Condemnation of Falsehoods  
and Increase Political Polarization 
No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other. 
- Hannah Arendt (1961) 
The political events of 2016 did little to challenge Arendt’s observation. Amid swirls 
of “fake news” and “alternative facts,” British politicians spread misinformation during the 
Brexit referendum (The Economist, 2016), and the American Presidential candidates made 
dozens of false claims (Politifact, n.d.). Once the public recognizes a falsehood, how do they 
judge the ethicality of telling it? These judgments have the potential to mobilize voters and 
shape elections by sparking moral outrage (cf. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Pagano & 
Huo, 2007), but not all falsehoods receive the same harsh judgments. I argue that imagining 
alternatives to reality powerfully shapes such judgments. For example, to defend the false 
claim that more people attended Donald Trump’s inauguration than Barack Obama’s, 
spokespeople proposed Trump’s crowd would have been larger if the weather had been better 
(Rossoll, 2017). Or some people might justify Hillary Clinton’s false claim that no Trump-
brand products are made in the U.S. (Dent, 2016) by imagining they would have been made 
abroad if it had been cheaper to do so. These conditional propositions – if circumstances had 
been different, then an event would have occurred – are called counterfactuals (see Byrne, 
2016). Logically, they do not render falsehoods true, but psychologically, they may make 
falsehoods seem less unethical. The present research tests whether making such 
counterfactuals salient can reduce the moral condemnation falsehoods receive. Minimizing 
the fallout from telling a falsehood may not require convincing people the falsehood is 
literally true; convincing them it could have been true may be sufficient. 
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Why would salient counterfactuals reduce moral condemnation of falsehoods? Even 
falsehoods that people explicitly recognize as false can still feel more or less truthful 
(Shidlovski, Schul, & Mayo, 2014). Moral judgments of such falsehoods depend not only on 
their literal truthfulness (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; Rogers, Zeckhauser, Gino, Norton, & 
Schweitzer, 2017) but also on how close to the truth they feel. Falsehoods that feel close to 
reality may seem more justified and less dishonest (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). For example, 
participants were more likely to lie about achieving a prize-winning die-roll when their actual 
roll was numerically close to (vs. far from) the winning number (Hilbig & Hessler, 2013). 
Despite the lie being just as false in all cases, participants may have felt it was less unethical 
to tell when it involved misreporting their roll by a small margin than a large margin (see also 
Briazu, Walsh, Deeprose, & Ganis, 2017 Study 4). 
Mental simulation is likely to play an important role in how close a falsehood feels to 
reality. In general, mentally simulating events bring them closer to reality (Koehler, 1991). 
People judge future events as more likely to occur when they have been instructed to imagine 
them (Anderson, 1983; Carroll, 1978; Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter, 1982) – and the easier 
it is to imagine them, the more likely they seem (Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & 
Reynolds, 1985). Similarly, when an event did not occur, people judge whether it “almost” 
occurred by mentally simulating counterfactual scenarios in which it could have occurred 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). The more easily such scenarios come to mind, the closer to 
reality the event will feel (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989; Kahneman & Miller, 1986). 
For example, a traveler will feel she “nearly” made her flight when she missed it by 5 
minutes versus 30 minutes, because it is easier to imagine scenarios in which she arrived 5 
minutes earlier (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In this way, salient counterfactuals can bring 
an event closer to reality (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Markman & Tetlock, 2000). 
Extending this reasoning, falsehoods should feel closer to the truth, and thus seem less 
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unethical to tell, when evaluated in the presence of salient counterfactuals about how they 
could have been true. 
Not everyone will be equally swayed by salient counterfactuals, however, particularly 
in political contexts. Reflecting on how a falsehood could have been true should affect moral 
judgments more powerfully when the falsehood aligns with one’s political views, for two 
reasons. First, for a salient counterfactual to affect judgments, it must be subjectively 
plausible (Petrocelli, Percy, Sherman, & Tormala, 2011). For example, suggesting “if the 
weather had been nicer, then Trump’s inauguration would have been larger” should have 
little effect on someone who believes (a) the weather had little chance of being nicer, or (b) 
even if the weather had been nicer, turnout would have remained the same. Second, people 
will find a counterfactual more plausible when it aligns with beliefs and ideologies they are 
motivated to defend (Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock & Henik, 2005; cf. Markman & Hirt, 2002), 
perhaps because people are unwilling or unable to imagine a counterfactual occurring if it 
challenges their views (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). For example, the 
Trump-inauguration counterfactual should seem more plausible to Trump supporters, who 
should be inclined to believe in Trump’s popularity, than to Clinton supporters.  
In this way, counterfactuals may help people reach motivated moral conclusions. 
Partisans should want to excuse falsehoods aligned with their political views (cf. Abrams, 
Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Mueller & Skitka, in press), but be reluctant to do 
so without justification (Kunda, 1990). Salient counterfactuals provide justification to the 
extent they are plausible, and the same counterfactual will seem more plausible when it aligns 
with one’s political preferences (Tetlock, 1998). Making a counterfactual salient should 
therefore have a larger effect on moral judgments of falsehoods that are aligned (vs. 
misaligned) with one’s political preferences, amplifying partisan differences in moral 
judgments of falsehoods. For example, Trump supporters should already express less 
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condemnation of the inauguration falsehood than his opponents do; imagining how his 
inauguration could have been bigger should increase this difference by mitigating supporters’ 
(more than opponents’) condemnation.  
Based on this logic, I tested three main hypotheses. First, reflecting on how a 
falsehood could have been true should lead people to judge it as less unethical to tell. Second, 
this effect should be larger when the falsehood aligns with their political preferences, 
resulting in larger partisan differences in judgments (i.e., increasing political polarization). 
Third, this increase in political polarization should be mediated by perceptions of the 
counterfactual’s plausibility. Evidence for the hypotheses would suggest leaders can reduce 
the negative consequences of telling a falsehood merely by convincing their supporters it 
could have been true.  
 These hypotheses advance work suggesting counterfactuals can facilitate dishonest 
behavior. In one study, participants who spontaneously generated more counterfactuals about 
how a car accident could have been avoided also generated more ways of lying to the police 
about how the accident occurred (Briazu et al., 2017). These results suggest lying and 
counterfactual thinking may share an underlying process. In another study, people were more 
likely to falsely claim they achieved an outcome when they had seen it occur than when they 
had not (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). Participants were asked to report a 
private die-roll honestly, but could earn more money for reporting higher numbers. They 
(dishonestly) reported higher numbers when they first completed two unpaid rolls than when 
they did not. Rather than maximizing their payout by reporting the highest roll possible, they 
reported the highest outcome they had observed on the unpaid rolls. Apparently, observing a 
“desired counterfactual” made lying feel more justified (Shalvi et al., 2011). However, 
because participants physically saw the counterfactual outcome, it is unclear whether mental 
simulation produced this effect. Going beyond this prior work, the present research is the first 
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to examine how mentally simulating counterfactuals can mitigate moral condemnation of 
others’ falsehoods, help people reach motivated moral conclusions, and magnify political 
polarization. 
The Present Research  
Three experiments tested these ideas in the context of the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election. Trump and Clinton supporters judged falsehoods that were aligned or misaligned 
with their political preferences. In Study 1, half the participants were randomly assigned to 
read a counterfactual proposition about how the falsehoods could have been true. I expected 
that this salient counterfactual would reduce how unethical they judged the falsehoods as 
being, and that this effect would be more pronounced when the falsehoods aligned with their 
political preferences. Study 2 sought to replicate these effects and rule out the possibility that 
the act of mental simulation in general (rather than the act of mentally simulating the 
counterfactual in particular) explained the results. Study 2 also examined whether salient 
counterfactuals would make politician who told the falsehoods seem more moral and less 
deserving of punishment. Study 3 sought to generalize these effects and address an 
alternative explanation by manipulating whether participants generated their own 
counterfactuals. All studies included measures to ensure people knew the falsehoods were 
false. I determined the targeted sample sizes in advance, and I report all conditions, 
dependent measures, and data exclusions. Studies 2 and 3 were pre-registered. 
Study 1 
Method 
Design. Participants evaluated six falsehoods in a 2 (condition: counterfactual vs. 
control; between-subjects) X 2 (falsehood: aligned vs. misaligned with participants’ political 
preferences; within-subjects) factorial design.  
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Participants. In March, 2017, I requested 1,000 U.S.-based participants from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) who supported either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton, 
rivals in the 2016 Presidential election. I selected this large sample size because a pilot study 
suggested a small main effect of the counterfactual manipulation, and because I wanted 
sufficient statistical power to examine a potential moderator. After applying a priori 
exclusion criteria to promote data quality (e.g., discarding data from duplicates IP address), 
1,030 participants were reduced to 1,019. I classified people as supporting a candidate if they 
had voted or had intended to vote for him or her. Programmed quotas ensured a similar 
number of participants supported each candidate (507 Trump supporters and 512 Clinton 
supporters). (See Online Supplement for details about eligibility criteria, exclusions, and 
sample characteristics). 
Procedure. Participants viewed a fact related to the 2016 Presidential candidates, 
randomly selected from a bank of six (e.g., “It’s a proven fact that Donald Trump won the 
electoral vote, but lost the popular vote to Hillary Clinton”; see Table 1). Participants 
randomly assigned to the counterfactual condition read a conditional proposition about how 
the opposite of the fact could have been true (e.g., “If only Trump had tried to win the 
popular vote, then he would have won the popular vote”), and rated the proposition’s 
plausibility (see below). Participants in the control condition neither read nor rated the 
proposition. For the dependent measure (described below), all participants rated how 
unethical it would be to tell a falsehood that contradicted the fact (e.g., “Trump won the 
popular vote;” see Table 1).  
Staying in the same condition, participants then repeated this procedure for the 
remaining facts (and corresponding falsehoods) from the bank, in randomized order (see 
Table 1). Of the six falsehoods, three aligned with Trump supporters’ political views (i.e., 
two painted Trump positively and one painted Clinton negatively), and three aligned with 
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Clinton supporters’ political views (i.e., two painted Trump negatively and one painted 
Clinton positively). The falsehoods were taken from or inspired by claims actually made by 
or about the candidates. Finally, I tested participants’ memory for the facts’ truthfulness (see 
below). 
Measures. 
Dependent measure: Unethicality of telling falsehoods. Six items assessed the 
unethicality of telling each falsehood (αs > .84 for each falsehood): how dishonest, justified*, 
unethical, acceptable*, and problematic it would be to make the statement, and how much of 
a lie it was (starred items were reverse-coded). To respond, participants moved a slider on 
100-point scales anchored at Not at all and Extremely, with the slider initially appearing at 50 
(αs > .84 for each falsehood).  
Counterfactual plausibility/potency. Would participants find a counterfactual more 
plausible when it aligned with their political preferences? When a counterfactual is expressed 
as a conditional (“if only X had occurred, then Y would have occurred”), a person could 
discount the plausibility of either the if component (i.e., “X could not have occurred”) or the 
then component (i.e., “even if X had occurred, Y would not have occurred”; Tetlock & 
Henik, 2005). Participants in the counterfactual condition rated the subjective plausibility of 
both components, for each counterfactual they considered, using items by Petrocelli and 
colleagues (2011). For example, after considering the counterfactual “If investigators had 
been able to see [Clinton’s] deleted emails, then the FBI would have brought charges against 
Hillary Clinton,” participants were asked, “What do you perceive was the likelihood of 
investigators actually being able to see the deleted emails?” and “Suppose that investigators 
had actually seen the deleted emails. Given that, what do you perceive was the likelihood that 
the FBI would have brought charges agains Clinton?” (1 = Not at all likely; 11 = Extremely 
likely). A counterfactual’s overall plausibility – termed counterfactual potency – is 
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operationalized as the multiplicative effect of the if and then likelihood ratings (Petrocelli et 
al., 2011; Petrocelli, Kammrath, Brinton, Uy, & Cowens, 2015). 
Memory. Would salient counterfactuals shape how people judge a falsehood simply 
by making them forget it is false (Gerlach, Dornblaser, & Schacter, 2014; Petrocelli & 
Crysel, 2009)? To rule out this possibility, I asked participants to categorize six statements as 
true/false (see Online Supplement). Three statements referred to the facts and three referred 
to the falsehoods participants had seen earlier. I predicted the manipulation would not affect 
this memory measure. 
Additional measures. All studies also included exploratory measures of political 
knowledge and approval of Donald Trump, discussed in the Online Supplement. 
Results 
All studies report results collapsed across the six falsehoods; the Online Supplement 
reports results for each individual falsehood. The analyses in all studies produced identical 
conclusions when they included fixed effects for individual falsehoods. 
Unethicality of telling falsehoods. Overall, people thought it would be unethical to 
tell the falsehoods, shown by mean ratings exceeding the scale midpoint. As predicted, 
however, they thought it would be less unethical when they had considered counterfactuals 
(M = 77.49, SD = 16.23) than when they had not (M = 82.17, SD = 17.65), d = .28, b = –4.70, 
z = 4.46, p < .001 in a mixed-effect regression analysis, with a dummy code for condition (1 
= counterfactual, 0 = control), and a random effect for participant (see Table 2, step 1). This 
effect was significantly larger when participants judged falsehoods that were aligned (vs. 
misaligned) with their political preferences (see Figure 1). That is, when I added a dummy 
code for alignment (1 = aligned, 0 = misaligned) and its interaction with condition to the 
regression, the interaction was negative and significant, b = -1.93, z = 2.14, p = .032 (see 
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Table 2, step 2). At this point in the research process, I considered this interaction test 
exploratory; Studies 2 and 3 provide confirmatory tests.  
To better understand the interaction, I computed simple slopes. The manipulation had 
a significant effect regardless of alignment, but as noted this effect was bigger for statements 
that were aligned with political preferences (Mcounterfactual = 72.83, Mcontrol = 78.46; SDs = 
19.77 and 20.80, respectively), d = .28, z = 4.92, p < .001, versus misaligned (Mcounterfactual = 
82.33, Mcontrol = 85.98, SDs = 16.51 and 17.70, respectively), d = .21, z = 3.24, p = .001. 
Decomposing the interaction the other way shows that participants thought it was less 
unethical to make a false statement that aligned (vs. did not align) with their views in the 
control condition, d = .39, z = 11.96, p < .001, and the counterfactual condition amplified this 
effect, d = .52, z = 14.89, p < .001. In other words, considering counterfactuals increased 
political polarization in moral judgments. 
Counterfactual potency. Why did considering counterfactuals increase political 
polarization? I speculated it was because people found a counterfactual more potent (i.e., 
plausible) if it aligned with their political views, and the more potent they found the 
counterfactual, the less unethical they would judge the falsehood. Consistent with this idea, 
the data showed a significant negative indirect effect of alignment on unethicality judgments 
via potency ratings in the counterfactual condition (see Figure 2), b = -3.00 [-3.68, -2.29]. 
This analysis omits the control condition because its participants neither saw nor rated 
counterfactuals. As noted, potency was computed as the product of likelihood ratings for the 
if and then part of each counterfactual (Petrocelli et al., 2011). The 95% CI around the 
indirect effect was calculated with 5,000 resamples and bias-corrected with Stat’s 
ml_mediation function, which accounted for the multi-level nature of the data. (The path 
from potency to unethicality remained significant when controlling for the simple effects of 
both if and then likelihoods).   
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Memory. Did considering counterfactuals make people forget the falsities were false? 
I expected not, and to find out, I coded whether responses to each memory item were correct 
(1) or incorrect (0). People correctly distinguished fact from fiction a high percentage of the 
time, and this percentage was virtually identical in both conditions (control: 91.81%; 
counterfactual: 92.26%), b = .08, z = .63, p = .53 in a mixed-effect logistic regression with 
participant as a random effect. This result did not depend on whether the falsehood aligned 
with political preferences, b = -.25, z = 1.16, p = .245 for the interaction when added with the 
simple effect of alignment to the regression. Thus, considering counterfactuals reduced 
condemnation of falsehoods even though participants acknowledged their falsity. 
 Discussion 
 Supporting the hypotheses, salient counterfactuals made falsehoods seem less 
unethical to tell. This effect was larger when the falsehoods aligned with one’s political 
preferences, and the results were consistent with the idea that this was because alignment 
increased the counterfactuals’ perceived plausibility. There was no support for the possibility 
that considering counterfactuals simply made people forget the falsehoods were false.  
Study 2 
Study 1 manipulated whether people imagined counterfactuals or did nothing. To 
address whether the results were due to the mere act of imagination in general, rather than 
imagining counterfactuals in particular, Study 2 manipulated whether people imagined how a 
falsehood might have been true (counterfactual) or how an event might occur (control). 
Although both conditions require imagination, I expected the falsehood to seem less unethical 
in the counterfactual condition. 
Study 2 also examined potential downstream consequences of salient counterfactuals. 
Participants indicated how they would react if a politician they supported told the relevant 
falsehood. I predicted that, by diminishing the falsehoods’ subjective unethicality, the 
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counterfactual manipulation would lead people to judge the candidate as having better moral 
character and deserving less punishment. 
Finally, Study 2 included a more sensitive memory measure to ensure the results were 
not due to forgetting the falsehoods were false. 
Method 
Design. I preregistered the hypotheses, target sample size, methods, and analytic 
strategy (see http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=4qd5jw). As in Study 1, participants 
evaluated six falsehoods in a 2 (condition: counterfactual vs. control; between-subjects) X 2 
(falsehood: aligned vs. misaligned with participants’ political preferences; within-subjects) 
factorial design. 
 Participants. I posted slots for 800 MTurk participants in April, 2017. I targeted this 
sample size because a power simulation showed it provided 85% power to detect Study 1’s 
main effect at α = .05, one-tailed. Of the 906 people who began the study, 884 remained after 
applying pre-registered exclusion criteria. With no quotas programmed, the sample contained 
more Clinton supporters (468) than Trump supporters (224), and 192 people who supported 
neither candidate. (See Online Supplement for more details about the power simulation, 
eligibility criteria, exclusions, and sample characteristics). 
 Procedure. The counterfactual condition was identical to Study 1, with slight changes 
to the counterfactuals’ wording (see Table 1): Participants read one of the six political facts 
(e.g., It’s a proven fact that Trump-brand hats, wine, and water are made in the USA), 
considered an if-then statement about how its opposite could have been true (If Trump had 
been able to make those products more cheaply in a different country, then he would have 
made them outside of the USA), and rated the if-then statement’s potency.  
In a new control condition, participants read the same fact, considered an if-then 
statement about how a related event could occur in the future (If an American car 
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manufacturer moves a factory outside the USA, then the quality of the cars will decrease; see 
Table 1), and rated the if-then statement’s potency (Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2012). Thus, 
both conditions involved rating an if-then statement and mentally simulating an event that 
had not occurred, but only the counterfactual condition required imagining how the falsehood 
could have been true. Only in the counterfactual condition did the potency ratings represent 
counterfactual potency, so I did not analyze them in the control condition. After the 
manipulation, participants completed the dependent measures (see below), repeated the 
procedure for the remaining five political facts (see Table 1), and then completed the memory 
measure (see below). 
 Measures. 
Main dependent measure: Unethicality of telling falsehoods. Participants rated the 
unethicality of telling each falsehood using the six-item scale from Study 1 (αs > .82 for each 
falsehood). 
 Moral character and punitive sentiment. Two new measures assessed potential 
consequences of perceiving falsehoods as unethical to tell. For each false statement, 
participants imagined that a Congressional candidate from their district, for whom they are 
considering voting, publicly insists that the statement is true. Then they rated the candidate’s 
moral character on three items (honest, trustworthy, and principled; αs > .92 for each 
falsehood; 0 = Not at all, 100 = Extremely)(Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), and indicated 
their agreement with four punitive sentiments: “The candidate should drop out of the race for 
making that statement,” “The candidate deserves to be publicly criticized for making that 
statement,” “Because of that statement, I would think twice before voting for this candidate,” 
and “That statement would make me withdraw my support from the candidate” (-50 = 
Strongly disagree, 50 = Strongly agree; αs > .87). I predicted the manipulation would 
increase moral character ratings and decrease punitive sentiment by making the falsehoods 
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seem less unethical to tell (an indirect effect). I also predicted a total effect of the 
manipulation on these measures, particularly when the falsehoods were aligned (vs. 
misaligned) with participants’ political views.  
Memory and confidence. Participants answered the six true-false questions from 
Study 1. I expected the manipulation not to affect this measure. To assess memory more 
precisely, I also asked participants to indicate their confidence in each true/false answer on a 
0%-to-100% scale (Koch & Forgas, 2012). I expected all predicted effects to remain reliable 
when controlling for confidence. 
Results 
As I had strong directional predictions, I pre-registered and report one-tailed 
significance tests for all confirmatory analyses. As indicated below, I report two-tailed tests 
for exploratory analyses. 
Unethicality of telling falsehoods. Replicating Study 1 with a more stringent control 
condition, people rated the falsehoods as significantly less unethical when they imagined how 
the falsehoods could have been true (Mcounterfactual = 76.09, SD = 16.07) than when they 
imagined how an event could occur in the future (Mcontrol = 78.07, SD = 15.08), d = .13, b = –
2.14, z = 2.08, p = .019 in a mixed regression model with participant as a random effect (see 
Table 3, Step 1). Also replicating Study 1, and as expected, this effect was significantly larger 
for statements that were aligned versus misaligned with participants’ political views (see 
Figure 3), b = -2.80, z = 2.35, p = .0095 for the condition X alignment interaction (see Table 
3, Step 2). (Because alignment could not be coded for participants who supported neither 
Trump nor Clinton, I had to omit these participants from the interaction test, leaving 692).  
To better understand the interaction, I computed simple slopes. For falsehoods that 
aligned with political preferences, considering counterfactuals significantly reduced 
unethicality ratings, as in Study 1 and as expected (Mcounterfactual = 71.70, Mcontrol = 75.53; SDs 
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= 19.47 and 17.26, respectively), d = .21, b = -3.64, z = 2.80, p = .003. For falsehoods that 
were misaligned with political preferences, considering counterfactuals had no significant 
effect (Mcounterfactual = 80.69, Mcontrol = 81.68; SDs = 17.32 and 15.79, respectively), d = .06, b 
= -.84, z = .64, p = .260  (see Figure 3). Based on Study 1’s results, I had expected the effect 
for misaligned falsehoods to be significant (which it was not), though smaller than the effect 
for aligned falsehoods (which it was).  
Decomposing the interaction the other way with exploratory (two-tailed) tests 
revealed that people rated the falsehoods that were aligned with their political preferences as 
less unethical than those that were misaligned in both conditions, but that this difference was 
larger in the counterfactual condition, d = .49, b = -9.05, z = 10.39, p < .001, than in the 
control condition, d = .37, b = -6.25, z = 7.43, p < .001. Thus, as in Study 1, the 
counterfactuals exacerbated existing political polarization in moral judgments. 
Counterfactual potency. Why did the counterfactual-thinking manipulation increase 
political polarization? As in Study 1, I tested the role of counterfactual potency. A mediation 
analysis replicated Study 1’s results: a significant, negative indirect effect from alignment to 
potency ratings to dishonesty judgments in the counterfactual condition, b = -3.87 [-4.98, -
2.91] (see Figure 4). This analysis omits the control condition because it did not measure 
counterfactual potency. These results are consistent with the idea that counterfactuals 
increased political polarization because they seemed more plausible – i.e., were more potent 
– when they supported desired political conclusions. (I pre-registered the prediction that 
greater potency would predict lower dishonesty ratings, but did not consider the full 
mediation model until after data were collected). 
Moral character and punitive sentiment. I next tested the prediction that because 
counterfactual thinking reduced the perceived unethicality of telling a falsehood, it would 
lead people to rate a candidate who told the falsehood as higher in moral character and less 
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deserving of punishment. Consistent with this prediction, there was a significant positive 
indirect effect from condition (counterfactual vs. control), to the unethicality of telling the 
falsehood, to the moral character of the candidate, b = 1.29 [.16, 2.65], and a negative indirect 
effect to punitive sentiment, b = -1.29 [-2.59, -.19], computed as above using Stata’s 
ml_mediation command.  
Additional analyses (see Online Supplement) did not support the prediction that 
considering counterfactuals would raise moral character ratings or lower punitive sentiment 
overall. Thus, there was a reliable and theoretically meaningful indirect effect on these 
measures without a reliable total effect (see Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). As 
predicted, the manipulation also had a larger effect on moral character judgments and 
punitive sentiment when falsehoods aligned (vs. misaligned) with participants’ political 
preferences    
 Memory. I next tested whether memory distortion could explain the effects of 
considering counterfactuals. Once again, people correctly distinguished fact from fiction a 
high percentage of the time, and as predicted, it was statistically indistinguishable across 
conditions (control: 91.45%; counterfactual: 91.24%), b = .04, z = .21, p = .832 (two-tailed) 
in a mixed logistic regression. An exploratory test showed no significant moderation by 
whether the falsehood aligned with political preferences, b = .04, z = .16, p = .873 (two-
tailed). 
 Further exploration showed that people were marginally less confident in their 
judgments about the statements’ truth in the counterfactual condition than in the prefactual 
condition (Ms = 90.16 and 91.66, SDs = 12.11 and 10.11, respectively), b = -1.50, z = 1.95, p 
= .051 (two-tailed), providing some evidence that the manipulation affected memory. 
However, this effect did not depend on whether the falsehood aligned with political 
preferences, b = .04, z = .16, p = .873 (two-tailed) – and crucially, as predicted, the direction 
COUNTERFACTUALS AND POLITICAL FALSEHOODS 18 
and significant of the results for all dependent measures (statement dishonesty, candidate 
morality, and negative consequences) were identical after statistically controlling for 
confidence ratings. Thus, counterfactual thinking may reduce people’s confidence that 
falsehoods are false (cf. Petrocelli & Crysel, 2009), but this effect was insufficient to explain 
why considering counterfactuals reduced perceptions of falsehoods’ dishonesty. 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated Study 1 and suggested that the general act of imagination did not 
produce the results. Imagining counterfactuals in particular – compared to imagining the 
future – made falsehoods seem less unethical to tell. Again, the effect was larger when the 
falsehoods aligned with participants’ political preferences, and the data were consistent with 
the idea that this was because alignment increased the counterfactuals’ perceived plausibility. 
A salient counterfactual also helped insulate a favored politician from the negative 
consequences of telling falsehoods. Finally, using a more sensitive measure than Study 1, 
Study 2 found no evidence that memory distortion could explain the results. 
Study 3 
A potential alternative explanation is that factual information embedded in the 
counterfactuals, rather than the counterfactuals themselves, mitigated condemnation of 
falsehoods. For example, asking whether Trump’s inauguration would have been bigger if 
security had not been so strict reveals the fact security was strict. To address this possibility, 
Study 3 tested whether the effects would replicate if participants generated their own 
counterfactuals. This manipulation ensures all participants receive the same factual 
information, and tests generalizability beyond the specific counterfactuals used in the 
previous studies. 
Method 
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Design. I preregistered the hypotheses, sample size, methods, and analytic strategy 
(see http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ym5ba9). As in Studies 1 and 2, participants 
evaluated six falsehoods in a 2 (condition: counterfactual vs. control; between-subjects) X 2 
(false statement: aligned vs. misaligned with participants’ political preferences; within-
subjects) factorial. 
 Participants. Study 3 ran in May, 2017, on MTurk. I posted 800 slots to target Study 
2’s sample size. Of the 891 people who began the study, 871 remained after applying the pre-
registered exclusion criteria used in Study 2. The final sample contained 457 Clinton 
supporters, 244 Trump supporters, and 170 who supported neither candidate. (See Online 
Supplement for additional details).  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2, except participants randomly 
assigned to the counterfactual condition were asked to generate their own counterfactual 
thoughts about each of the six facts in Table 1, whereas those in the control condition were 
not. For example, participants in both conditions read, “It’s a proven fact that fewer people 
attended Donald Trump's inauguration than Barack Obama’s.” Only people in the 
counterfactual condition then read: 
However, it's possible to imagine that more people would have attended Trump's 
inauguration than Obama's if circumstances had been different. Please complete the 
statement below by filling in the blank.  
 
More people would have attended Trump’s inauguration than Obama's, 
if  ___________________.     
 
There was space to complete the sentence in up to three different ways. 
 Measures. As in Study 2, participants rated the unethicality of telling the six 
falsehoods shown in Table 1 (αs > .81), the moral character of a politician who asserted the 
falsehoods (αs > .91), and their punitive sentiment toward the politician (αs > .86). At the 
end of the study, they completed Study 2’s memory check items and confidence ratings. 
Study 3 did not administer the counterfactual-potency measure due to concern that the wide 
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range of counterfactuals generated would lend too much variance to this measure for 
meaningful interpretation. 
Results 
As I had strong directional predictions, I pre-registered and report one-tailed 
significance tests for all confirmatory analyses. Where indicated, I report two-tailed tests for 
exploratory analyses. Showing that participants complied with the manipulation, 94% of 
responses in the counterfactual condition provided at least one counterfactual thought (M = 
1.78 counterfactuals listed, SD = .96). 
 Unethicality of telling falsehoods. Replicating Studies 1 and 2’s results with a new 
manipulation, Study 3 participants rated the falsehoods as significantly less dishonest when 
prompted to generate counterfactuals (M = 78.43, SD = 14.90) than when not prompted (M = 
80.50, SD = 16.94), b = –2.12, z = 2.00, p = .023, d = .13 (see Table 4, Step 1) in a mixed 
regression model with condition (1 = counterfactual, 0 = control) as a fixed effect and 
participant as a random effect. Also replicating Studies 1 and 2, the manipulation effect was 
significantly larger for statements that were aligned versus misaligned with participants’ 
political views (see Figure 5), b = -4.37, z = 3.98, p < .001 for the condition X alignment 
interaction (see Table 4, Step 2). (Alignment could not be coded for participants who 
supported neither Clinton nor Trump, so I had to omit their data from the interaction test, 
leaving 701 people). 
Next, I decomposed the interaction by computing simple slopes. For falsehoods that 
aligned with political preferences, the new counterfactual manipulation significantly 
decreased unethicality ratings, as predicted (Mcontrol = 77.81, Mcounterfactual = 74.04; SDs = 
19.26 and 18.64, respectively), b = -3.81, z = 2.92, p =.002, d = .20. Based on Study 1’s 
results, I had predicted that the smaller manipulation effect for misaligned statements would 
still be significant, but as in Study 2 it was not (Mcontrol = 83.01, Mcounterfactual = 83.46; SDs = 
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14.96 and 17.78, respectively), b = .56, z = .43, p = .334, d = -.03. Decomposing the 
interaction the other way with (two-tailed) exploratory analyses shows that participants 
thought it was less unethical to make a false statement when it aligned (vs. did not align) with 
their views in the control condition, d = -.28, b  = -5.31, z = 6.97, p < .001, and the 
counterfactual condition amplified this effect, d = -.56, b = -9.68, z = 12.26, p < .001. In this 
way, generating counterfactuals exacerbated existing political polarization. 
Moral character and punitive sentiment.  I next tested the prediction that because 
counterfactual thinking reduced the perceived unethicality of telling a falsehood, it would 
lead people to rate a candidate who told the falsehood as higher in moral character and less 
deserving of punishment. Like Study 2, Study 3 supported this prediction with a significant 
indirect effect from condition, to the unethicality of telling the falsehood, to the moral 
character of the candidate, b = 1.14 [.053, 2.33], and (in a separate analysis) from condition 
to falsehood unethicality to punitive sentiment, b = -1.17 [-2.40, -.054], computed as in Study 
2 using Stata’s ml_mediation command. 
Additional analyses (see Online Supplement) confirmed the prediction that generating 
counterfactuals would raise moral character ratings overall, but not the prediction that it 
would lower punitive sentiment overall. These analyses also showed, as predicted, a 
significantly larger manipulation effect on these variables when falsehoods were aligned (vs. 
misaligned) with participants’ political preferences.  
Memory. Did the counterfactual manipulation affect people’s memory for the 
statements’ truth value? Some evidence suggests so. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, and contrary to 
predictions, participants at the end of the study were significantly less likely to correctly 
identify whether the statements were true (90.37%) than in the control condition (92.56%), b 
= -.58, z = 2.41, p = .016 (two-tailed). Also, people were marginally less confident about their 
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memories in the counterfactual condition (M = 91.97, SD = 11.60) than in the control 
condition (M = 93.37, SD = 9.68), b = -1.40, z = 1.89, p = .059 (two-tailed), d = .13.  
Importantly, though, these memory effects are insufficient to explain why generating 
counterfactuals affected unethicality judgments. First, neither memory effect depended on 
whether the falsehoods aligned with political preferences, b = -.04, z = .14, p = .892 and b = -
.04, z = .06, p = .954, respectively. Second, all results above remained significant when I 
reran the analyses including only observations where people correctly identified the 
statement’s falsity. Third, regardless of whether only these or all observations were retained, 
the results also remained significant when controlling for confidence judgments, as predicted. 
Thus, even among people who accurately remembered the statements as false, and even 
holding constant people’s confidence in their falsity across conditions, generating 
counterfactuals still reduced how dishonest people thought it was to make those statements. 
Discussion 
Prompting people to generate their own counterfactuals about how a falsehood could 
have been true reduced their condemnation of it, as long as the falsehood aligned with their 
political preferences. Study 3 thus attests to the effects’ generalizability and robustness by 
demonstrating they do not depend on providing people with specific counterfactual thoughts.  
Meta-Analysis and Bayesian Analysis 
 To better estimate the effect sizes, I meta-analyzed Studies 1-3. Given the similarity 
of paradigms and participant populations, I adopted a fixed-effects approach, but a random-
effects approach produced the same conclusions, except where indicated.  
Across studies, considering counterfactuals decreased unethicality judgments (see 
Figure 6). Across all falsehoods, this effect was small but significant, as indicated by a 95% 
CI that excluded 0, d = .18 [0.11, 0.26]. The effect was significant regardless of whether 
falsehoods aligned with political preferences, but was larger for those that were aligned than 
COUNTERFACTUALS AND POLITICAL FALSEHOODS 23 
for those that were misaligned, ds = .23 [.15, .03] and .010 [.02, .18], respectively. Also, the 
effect for misaligned falsehoods was not very robust; it only emerged in Study 1, and was not 
significant in the meta-analysis when specifying random effects, 95% CI = [-.06, .23]. 
 Figure 7 shows how considering counterfactuals increased political polarization in 
unethicality judgments across studies. Here, the effect sizes represent the difference between 
judgments of falsehoods that were aligned versus misaligned with political preferences. 
Larger effect sizes thus represent greater political polarization in judgments of the same 
falsehoods. The results showed significant and modestly-sized political polarization 
regardless of condition, but the effect size was larger in the counterfactual conditions than in 
the control conditions, ds = .52 [.44, .60] and .35 [.027, .043].  
 To quantify the evidence in favor of the hypothesis, I performed Bayesian t-tests 
(two-tailed) on data collapsed across all studies, using the JASP statistical software and its 
default Cauchy prior width of r = .707 (Wagenmakers et al., 2016). The conclusions 
complemented the meta-analysis. Across all falsehoods, the Bayes factor (BF10) was 5,536, 
indicating the data were over 5,000 times more likely to have been observed under the 
hypothesis that the manipulation affected ethicality judgments than under the null hypothesis 
that it did not. Falsehoods that aligned with political preferences showed even stronger 
evidence favoring the hypothesis; the data were over 600,000 times more likely under the 
hypothesis than under the null (BF10 = 613,655). By contrast, falsehoods that were 
misaligned with political preferences did not show Bayesian evidence of the effect; the 
likelihood of observing the data was about equal under the hypothesis and the null (BF10 = 
.93). One-tailed tests produced similar conclusions. 
Together, these results provide robust meta-analytic and Bayesian evidence that 
salient counterfactuals can decrease unethicality judgments of falsehoods. The effect sizes 
were small but robust when falsehoods aligned with political preferences (e.g., average d = 
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.23), but there was not consistent evidence for an effect when falsehoods were misaligned 
with such preferences. Theoretically, it is important that brief counterfactual reflection can 
shift moral judgments of falsehoods at all (see Prentice & Miller, 1992). Practically, small 
effects on judgments of political falsehoods are important when elections, like the 2016 US 
Presidential race, are won by slim margins.  
General Discussion 
“Truth. It’s grounded in facts,” reminds a New York Times advertisement. The 
present research suggests that judgments of falsehoods are grounded in counterfactuals. 
Reflecting on how a falsehood could have been true led people to judge it as less unethical to 
tell, despite acknowledging its falsity. This effect emerged in three studies (two pre-
registered; total N = 2,783), and it was associated with greater moral condemnation and 
punitive sentiment towards a politician who told a falsehood. The effect was driven by 
falsehoods aligned with one’s political views (see Figure 6), and it exacerbated a tendency to 
condemn such falsehoods less harshly than falsehoods that were misaligned with one’s 
politics (see Figure 7). When judging alleged dishonesty, Americans already show dramatic 
partisan disagreement (Washington Post-ABC News National Poll, 2015); the present results 
show how counterfactual thinking can increase this political polarization. 
What explains these effects? People may evaluate a falsehood’s ethicality based on its 
closeness to reality, and an event that did not occur will feel closer to reality when a 
counterfactual about how it could have occurred is both salient and plausible (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Petrocelli et al., 2011). The studies’ manipulations made the counterfactual 
salient, and participants’ political preferences shaped perceptions of its plausibility. In 
support of this mechanism, mediation analysis showed that an identical counterfactual 
seemed more plausible (potent) when it aligned with participants’ political preferences, and 
the more plausible participants found it, the more willing they were to excuse the 
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corresponding falsehood. No mediation analysis can demonstrate a causal mechanism 
because the mediator is measured, not manipulated (see Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011). 
However, the results fit with the idea that partisan differences in plausibility judgments 
explain why reflecting on a counterfactual increased political polarization in moral 
judgments. 
I have argued that mentally undoing a falsehood makes it seem closer to reality and 
thus less unethical to tell. A potential alternative interpretation of the results is that reflecting 
on a counterfactual puts people in a mental-simulation mindset (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 
2000; Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004) that changes the way they evaluate falsehoods. These 
two interpretations represent, respectively, a content-specific pathway, in which the 
counterfactual itself provides insights specifically related to the falsehood, and a content-
neutral pathway, in which the counterfactual affects information processing in general 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & Epstude, in press). The present results are more consistent 
with the content-specific pathway. Study 2 found that imagining a counterfactual reduced 
unethicality judgments more than imagining a future event – even though both tasks required 
mental simulation and therefore could be expected to foster a mental-simulation mindset. 
Additionally, Studies 1 and 2 found the effect emerged most strongly when people perceived 
the specific counterfactuals as plausible. An implausible counterfactual should not provide 
new insight into the falsehood, but can still be expected to foster a mental-simulation 
mindset. 
The results make several theoretical contributions. First, they advance understanding 
of how motivated reasoning affects moral judgments. People are reluctant to jump to desired 
moral conclusions without evidence, but will strategically construe ambiguous information as 
supporting these conclusions (Ames & Fiske, 2015; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; 
Effron, 2014). Counterfactuals may represent one source of ambiguous information. Even 
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when people are motivated to excuse a falsehood, it can be difficult to convince themselves it 
is literally true, because facts can be checked. It is easier to convince themselves it could 
have been true, because counterfactuals cannot be falsified; history cannot be rerun to test 
what would have occurred in alternative circumstances. Thus, counterfactuals provide a 
degree of freedom people can exploit to make motivated moral judgments.  
Second, the results contribute to a growing understanding of counterfactual thinking’s 
role in people’s moral lives. Previous work focused on the moral consequences of imagining 
counterfactual actions. For example, people feel licensed to act less virtuously when they 
reflect counterfactually on the transgressions they declined to perform (Effron, Miller, & 
Monin, 2012; Effron, Monin, & Miller, 2013), they feel guilty when they think 
counterfactually about the transgressions they did perform (Mandel & Dhami, 2005; 
Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Gaspar, Seabright, Reynolds, & Yam, 2015), and 
they judge others’ moral character based on counterfactual actions they imagine the others 
could have or would have performed (Miller, Visser, & Staub, 2005; Newman & Cain, 2014). 
By contrast, the present research focused on the moral consequences of imagining how a 
falsehood could have been true. Mentally undoing a falsehood reduces the moral 
condemnation it receives. 
Third, the studies contribute to a debate over whether counterfactual thinking has 
mainly functional or dysfunctional consequences (see Roese & Epstude, in press). On the 
functional side, counterfactuals prepare people for effective goal pursuit following failure 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). On the dysfunctional side, counterfactuals can 
interfere with learning and memory (Petrocelli & Harris, 2011; Petrocelli, Rubin, & Stevens, 
2016; Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2013). By examining counterfactual thinking’s moral and 
political consequences, the present research adds arguments to both sides. To the extent 
counterfactuals shield people from the discomfort of viewing admired leaders in a negative 
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light, they could be considered functional for individuals. But to the extent counterfactuals 
increase political polarization in judgments of falsehoods, and perhaps even license 
dishonesty by shielding these leaders from reproach, the consequences could be considered 
dysfunctional for society.  
Future research should examine whether the effect ever reverses. The Reflection and 
Evaluation Model of Comparative Thinking (Markman & McMullen, 2003, 2005) holds that 
merely imagining counterfactual outcomes – i.e., counterfactual reflection – will make 
people feel as if the outcomes did occur. By contrast, directly comparing counterfactual 
outcomes to reality – i.e., counterfactual evaluation – will highlight they did not occur. 
Situations fostering counterfactual evaluation could make falsehoods seem further from the 
truth and thus more unethical to tell. Research suggests that directly instructing people to 
engage in reflection versus evaluation can moderate the effect of counterfactual thinking on 
overconfidence (Petrocelli & Crysel, 2009). Perhaps such manipulations could also moderate 
the effect of counterfactuals on moral judgments.  
Future research should also examine whether this effect depends on the number of 
exposures to a particular counterfactual. In contrast to the present studies, real political 
contexts provide multiple opportunities to encounter the same counterfactual about how a 
falsehood could have been true. Such counterfactuals may get repeated in talking points, 
echoed throughout the news cycle, and shared on social media. On one hand, repeated 
exposure makes a counterfactual easier to imagine (De Brigard, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2013), 
which could amplify its exculpating effect. On the other hand, repeated exposure can also 
reduce a counterfactual’s subjective plausibility (De Brigard et al., 2013), which should 
diminish its exculpating effect. Testing these competing predictions would have both 
theoretical and practical value.  
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The present studies prompted participants to consider counterfactuals that “undid” 
falsehoods, but people are likely to generate such counterfactuals even without prompting. 
For example, negative affect causes counterfactual thought (Roese, 1997); perhaps the 
cognitive dissonance experienced when facts contradict an appealing falsehood triggers 
thoughts about how the falsehood could have been true. People may also strategically 
generate and publicize counterfactuals when motivated to excuse themselves or others for 
advancing a patently false claim. Thus, both dissonance and self-presentational concerns 
could motivate counterfactual thought about falsehoods.  
The rise of social media has allowed misinformation about everything from politics to 
health to history to spread at unprecedented speed, raising concerns about the difficulty of 
distinguishing fact from fiction. Even when people initially recognize information as false, 
they may later mistake their familiarity with it as a sign of truthfulness (Fazio, Brashier, 
Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Garry & Polaschek, 2000; Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). 
The present research raises a different concern. Mere exposure to misinformation, perhaps 
especially in the form of vivid narratives like “fake news” stories, may encourage people to 
imagine how it could have been true. As a result, even when people remember the 
misinformation as false, they may be more inclined to let public figures off the hook for 
asserting it as true. 
How can one blunt this effect? Warning about persuasion attempts and presenting 
weak arguments can “inoculate” against persuasion by subsequent, stronger arguments 
(Banas & Rains, 2010; McGuire, 1964). Perhaps warning about attempts to use 
counterfactuals to excuse dishonesty, and presenting implausible counterfactuals (e.g., 
Trump’s inauguration would have been bigger if Clinton had revealed she had voted for 
him), could similarly inoculate against the subsequent influence of more potent 
counterfactuals. Another strategy could be to encourage reflection on how the falsehood 
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would not have been true even if circumstances had been different (i.e., semi-factual thought; 
Byrne, 2016). For example, the proposition Trump’s inauguration would have been bigger if 
the weather had been better might seem less compelling when one considers whether it 
would have been the same size even if it had been an hour shorter. This strategy should be 
most effective when the even-if thought seems highly plausible (cf. Hirt & Markman, 1995). 
Future research should test these strategies’ effectiveness. 
Conclusion 
Pundits claim people privilege ideology over facts in our “post-truth” world (The 
Economist, 2016), but the present research suggests more nuance. Regardless of political 
views, participants condemned falsehoods. However, falsehoods supporting their views 
received less condemnation – and merely considering a counterfactual magnified this effect. 
Thus, partisans may not ignore facts, but readily excuse falsehoods based on weak 
justifications. We should thus be wary of our ability to imagine alternatives to reality. When 
leaders we support encourage us to consider how their lies could have been true, we may hold 
them to laxer ethical standards.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Stimuli in Studies 1-3 
Fact Counterfactual 
(Studies 1 and 2 only) 
Control statement 
(Study 2 only) 
Falsehood Falsehood 
aligns with 
politics of … 
     
It's a proven fact that fewer 
people attended Donald 
Trump's inauguration than 
Barack Obama's. 
Some ticketholders were unable to 
attend Trump's inauguration because the 
lines were too long at security. Consider 
the following thought:  If security had 
been less tight at Trump's inauguration, 
then more people would have attended it 
than Obama's inauguration. 
 
Think about how large the next 
presidential inauguration might be. 
Consider the following thought: If a 
Republican is elected president in 2020, 
then at least 100,000 people will attend 
the inauguration. 
 
More people 
attended 
Trump's 
inauguration 
than 
Obama's 
Trump 
supporters 
It's a proven fact that Donald 
Trump won the electoral vote, 
but lost the popular vote to 
Hillary Clinton 
Trump did not campaign for the popular 
vote, because the law says that the 
winner of the electoral vote wins the 
presidency. Consider the following 
thought: If Trump had tried to win the 
popular vote, then he would have won 
the popular vote. 
 
Senator Mitch McConnell is a 
Republican from Kentucky. He is 
currently the Senate Majority 
Leader. Consider the following thought: 
If Mitch McConnell runs for President in 
2020, then he will win the popular vote. 
 
Trump won 
the popular 
vote 
Trump 
supporters 
During the 2016 election 
campaign, the FBI 
investigated Hillary Clinton for 
improper use of a private 
email server.  It's a proven 
fact that the FBI never 
brought charges against her. 
Investigators did not see all of the emails 
stored on the private server because 
Clinton deleted some of them. Some 
people wonder whether the deleted 
emails contained evidence that Clinton 
broke the law. Consider the following 
thought:  If investigators had been able 
to see the deleted emails, then the FBI 
would have brought charges against 
Hillary Clinton. 
 
The current head of the FBI is James 
Comey, who does not have a military 
background. Some people wonder who 
the next FBI director will be.   Consider 
the following thought:  If the next 
director of the FBI has experience in the 
military, then more FBI agents will carry 
firearms. 
The FBI 
brought 
charges 
against 
Hillary 
Clinton 
Trump 
supporters 
(table continues on next page)  
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Table 1, continued 
 
Fact Counterfactual 
(Studies 1 and 2 only) 
Control statement 
(Study 2 only) 
Falsehood Falsehood 
aligns with 
politics of … 
It's a proven fact that Hillary 
Clinton lost the electoral vote 
to Donald Trump. 
Some people argue that new state laws 
passed by Republicans made it more 
difficult for Clinton supporters to cast 
their votes. For example, they argue that 
stricter voter ID laws made voting harder 
for poor and minority citizens, who tend 
to support Clinton.  Consider the 
following thought: If Republicans had not 
passed stricter voting laws, then Hillary 
Clinton would have won the electoral 
vote.  
 
Some people wonder who will run for 
president in 2020. For example, some 
wonder whether Senator Elizabeth 
Warren, a Democrat from 
Massachusetts, will choose to 
run.   Consider the following thought:  If 
Elizabeth Warren runs for president in 
2020, then she will win the electoral 
vote.  
Hillary 
Clinton won 
the electoral 
vote 
Clinton 
supporters 
It's a proven fact that Trump-
brand hats, wine, and water 
are made in the USA. 
` 
Consider the following thought: If Trump 
had been able to make those products 
more cheaply in a different country, then 
he would have made them outside the 
USA. 
 
Consider the following thought: If an 
American car manufacturer moves a 
factory outside the USA, then the 
quality of the cars will decrease. 
No Trump-
brand 
products are 
made in the 
USA 
Clinton 
supporters 
When Barack Obama was 
president, he placed a bust of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., in the 
oval office in the White 
House. It's a proven fact that 
the bust has remained in the 
oval office since Donald 
Trump became president, and 
has never been removed. 
 
Consider the following thought: If it had 
been possible for Trump to remove the 
MLK bust without the public finding out, 
then Trump would have removed it. 
 
Consider the following thought: If a 
Democrat is President in 50 years, then 
there will be a bust of Obama in the 
oval office. 
Trump 
removed the 
bust of 
Martin 
Luther King, 
Jr., from the 
oval office 
Clinton 
supporters 
 
Note. In Study 1 the counterfactuals were worded slightly differently: The phrase “consider the following thought” was replaced with “some people might think” 
and some of the counterfactuals were phrased “if only … then” instead of “if … then.” 
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Table 2  
Regression Results for Unethicality Ratings in Study 1 
DV:	Unethicality	ratings	 b	 SE(b)	 z	 p	
95%	Confidence	
interval	of	b	
Step	1	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
condition	 -4.70	 1.05	 -4.46	 0.000	 -6.76	 -2.63	
	
(constant)	 82.24	 0.74	 110.60	 0.000	 80.79	 83.70	
Step	2	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
condition	 -3.71	 1.15	 -3.24	 0.001	 -5.96	 -1.46	
	
alignment	 -7.60	 0.64	 -11.96	 0.000	 -8.84	 -6.35	
	
condition	X	
alignment	 -1.93	 0.90	 -2.14	 0.032	 -3.70	 -0.16	
	 (constant)	 86.03	 0.81	 106.40	 0.000	 84.45	 87.62	
 
Note. Condition was coded 1 = counterfactual, 0 = control. Alignment was coded = 1 
aligned, 0 = misaligned. The regression also included a random effect for participant. 
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Table 3 
Regression Results for Study 2  
	
DV:	Unethicality	ratings	 b	 SE(b)	 z	 p	
95%	
Confidence	
interval	of	b	
Unethicality	ratings	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Step	1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
condition	 -2.14	 1.03	 -2.08	 0.038	 -4.16	 -0.12	
	 	
(constant)	 78.26	 0.73	 107.23	 0.000	 76.83	 79.69	
	
Step	2	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
condition	 -0.83	 1.30	 -0.64	 0.525	 -3.38	 1.73	
	 	
alignment	 -6.23	 0.83	 -7.48	 0.000	 -7.86	 -4.60	
	 	
condition	X	
alignment	 -2.80	 1.19	 -2.35	 0.019	 -5.14	 -0.47	
	 	
(constant)	 81.66	 0.91	 89.50	 0.000	 79.88	 83.45	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Note. Two-tailed p-values are reported for reference; the main text reports 1-tailed 
values for pre-registered analyses. Condition was coded 1 = counterfactual, 0 = 
control. Alignment was coded 1 = aligned, 0 = misaligned. The regression also 
included a random effect for participant. Participants who did not support either 
candidate could not be included in Step 2, leaving 692. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results for Study 3 
	
Dependent	measure		 b	 SE(b)	 z	 p	
95%	Confidence	
interval	of	b	
Unethicality	ratings	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Step	1	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
condition	 -2.12	 1.06	 -2.00	 0.046	 -4.20	 -0.04	
	 	
(constant)	 80.69	 0.74	 108.59	 0.000	 79.24	 82.15	
	
Step	2	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
condition	 0.56	 1.31	 0.43	 0.668	 -2.00	 3.12	
	 	
alignment	 -5.31	 0.76	 -6.97	 0.000	 -6.81	 -3.82	
	 	
condition	X	
alignment	 -4.37	 1.10	 -3.98	 0.000	 -6.52	 -2.22	
	 	
(constant)	 83.13	 0.91	 91.34	 0.000	 81.34	 84.91	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Note. Two-tailed p-values are reported for reference; the main text reports 1-tailed 
values for pre-registered analyses. Condition was coded 1 = counterfactual, 0 = 
control. Alignment was coded = 1 aligned, 0 = misaligned. The regression also 
included a random effect for participant. Participants who did not support either 
candidate could not be included in Step 2, leaving 701. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Mean Unethicality Rating, by Condition and Alignment, ±95% CI, in Study 1 
 
 
Note. Means and 95% CIs computed from mixed regression analysis. Full scale of 
unethicality ratings is 0-100. 
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Figure 2 
Indirect Effect of Alignment on Unethicality Judgments, Through Counterfactual 
Potency, in Study 1’s Counterfactual Condition 
 
 
Note. Coefficients are unstandardized  
18.81 ***
Falsity aligned with 
political preference
Direct Effect: -6.52***
Indirect (mediated) effect:
b = -3.00 [-3.68, -2.29]
Counterfactual 
Potency
Unethicality of 
Telling Falsehood
-.16 **
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Figure 3 
Mean Unethicality Rating, by Condition and Alignment, ±95% CI, in Study 2 
 
 
Note. Means and 95% CIs computed from mixed regression analysis. Full scale of 
unethicality ratings is 0-100. 
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Figure 4 
Indirect Effect of Alignment on Unethicality Judgments, Through Counterfactual 
Potency, in Study 2’s Counterfactual Condition 
 
Note. Coefficients are unstandardized. 
21.85 ***
Falsity aligned with 
political preference
Direct Effect: -5.16***
Indirect (mediated) effect:
b = -3.87 [-4.98, -2.91]
Counterfactual 
Potency
Unethicality of 
Telling Falsehood
-.18 ***
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Figure 5 
Mean Unethicality Ratings, by Condition and Alignment, ±95% CI, in Study 3 
 
Note. Means and 95% CIs computed from mixed regression analysis. Full scale of 
unethicality ratings is 0-100. 
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Figure 6 
Meta-Analysis: The Counterfactual Manipulation Decreased Unethicality Judgments, 
Especially for Falsehoods Aligned With Political Preferences 
 
Note. The larger the effect size, the more the counterfactual manipulation reduced 
the falsehoods’ perceived unethicality. Lines show 95% CIs. Studies 2 and 3 pre-
registered one-tailed tests, so 95% CIs underestimate statistical significance. 
Diamonds show 95% CI for meta-analytic effect across studies. The size of the gray 
square is proportional to the sample size.  
Overall  (I-squared = 50.6%, p = 0.040)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.670)
misaligned
4
aligned
7
Subtotal  (I-squared = 68.3%, p = 0.042)
8
ID
overall
2
Study
3
Subtotal  (I-squared = 42.7%, p = 0.175)
5
1
6
9
0.17 (0.13, 0.22)
0.23 (0.15, 0.32)
0.21 (0.09, 0.34)
0.28 (0.15, 0.40)
0.10 (0.02, 0.18)
0.21 (0.06, 0.36)
SMD (95% CI)
0.13 (-0.00, 0.26)
0.13 (-0.00, 0.26)
0.18 (0.11, 0.26)
0.06 (-0.09, 0.21)
0.28 (0.15, 0.40)
-0.03 (-0.18, 0.12)
0.20 (0.05, 0.35)
  -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Overall  (I-squared = 50.6%, p = 0.040)
Subtotal  (I-squared = 0.0%, p = 0.670)
misaligned
4
aligned
7
Subtotal  (I-squared = 68.3%, p = 0.042)
8
ID
overall
2
Study
3
Subtotal  (I-squared = 42.7%, p = 0.175)
5
1
6
9
0.17 (0.13, 0.22)
0.23 (0.15, 0.32)
0.21 (0.09, 0.34)
0.28 (0.15, 0.40)
0.10 (0.02, 0.18)
0.21 (0.06, 0.36)
SMD (95% CI)
0.13 (-0.00, 0.26)
0.13 (-0.00, 0.26)
0.18 (0.11, 0.26)
0.06 (-0.09, 0.21)
0.28 (0.15, 0.40)
-0.03 (-0.18, 0.12)
0.20 (0.05, 0.35)
  -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Effect size (d) 
Cohen’s d (95% CI) 
All Falsehoods 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Study 3 
Overall 
Misaligned Falsehoods 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Study 3 
Overall 
Aligned Falsehoods 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Study 3 
Overall 
Eﬀects	 f	
counterfactual	
manipula2on	
COUNTERFACTUALS AND POLITICAL FALSEHOODS 50 
Figure 7 
Meta-Analysis: The Counterfactual Manipulation Increased Political Polarization 
 
 
Note. The larger the effect size, the greater the tendency to perceive falsehoods as 
less unethical when aligned (vs. misaligned) with one’s political views. Thus, larger 
effect sizes indicate greater political polarization. The graph shows that the 
counterfactual condition increased political polarization relative to the control 
condition. The size of the gray square is proportional to the sample size. 
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